Location Privacy of Non-Stationary Incumbent Systems in Spectrum Sharing
Location Privacy of Non-Stationary Incumbent Systems in Spectrum Sharing
复制标题
频谱共享中非固定现有系统的位置隐私
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Park
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Vaka;Sudeep Bhattarai;J. Park
虽然使用地理定位数据库进行频谱共享具有许多实用的优点，但它也带来了潜在的严重操作安全（OPSEC）问题。鉴于最近在美国要求在联邦政府（包括军事）系统和非政府系统（例如，蜂窝服务提供商）。在本文中，我们探讨了OPSEC，特别是位置隐私，在3.5 GHz频段的现任雷达。首先，我们表明，对抗性的二级用户可以很容易地推断出现任雷达的位置，使看似无害的查询数据库。然后，我们提出了几个混淆技术，可以实现的数据库来对抗推理攻击。我们还研究了混淆程度和频谱利用效率之间的内在权衡。最后，我们验证我们的讨论提供了广泛的模拟结果。
Although using geolocation databases for spectrum sharing has many pragmatic advantages, it also raises potentially serious operational security (OPSEC) issues. OPSEC is especially a paramount consideration in the light of recent calls in the U.S. for spectrum sharing between federal government (including military) systems and non- government systems (e.g., cellular service providers). In this paper, we explore the OPSEC, location privacy in particular, of incumbent radars in the 3.5 GHz band. First, we show that adversarial secondary users can easily infer the locations of incumbent radars by making seemingly innocuous queries to the database. Then, we propose several obfuscation techniques that can be implemented by the database for countering the inference attacks. We also investigate the inherent tradeoff between the degree of obfuscation and spectrum utilization efficiency. Finally, we validate our discussions by providing results from extensive simulations.