Airline revenue management games with simultaneous price and quantity competition
Airline revenue management games with simultaneous price and quantity competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cor.2016.05.008
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发表时间：
2016-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Grauberger;A. Kimms
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Grauberger;A. Kimms
本文研究了网络中同时存在价格和数量竞争的航空公司收益管理问题。在这种情况下，竞争对手的需求是其价格以及竞争对手的价格和预订限制的函数。我们提出了一个优化网络收益管理博弈中竞争对手行为的模型。据我们所知，我们的型号是这种类型的第一款。我们还提出了一种方法来计算博弈中可能近似的纳什均衡，假设竞争对手根据我们的模型做出决策。由于模型是非线性的，我们分别计算均衡价格和预订限制。算例表明了该方法的性能。当同时考虑价格竞争和数量竞争时，价格和需求往往会增加，导致收入比垄断价格高。
This paper treats airline revenue management under simultaneous price and quantity competition in a network. Within this setting, a competitor's demand is a function of his price as well as the competitor's price and booking limits. We present a model to optimize a competitor's behavior in a network revenue management game. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first of this type. We also present an approach to compute a possibly approximate Nash equilibrium in the game assuming that the competitors make decisions based on our model. Since the model is non-linear, we compute equilibrium prices and booking limits separately. The procedure's performance is shown in a computational study. When both price competition and quantity competition are taken into account, prices as well as demands tend to increase leading to higher revenues compared to monopolistic prices.