Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004
Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004
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1946-2004 年政权类型、表现和即将卸任的独裁者的命运负责什么?
DOI:
10.1080/13510347.2013.738866
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发表时间:
2013
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Abel Escribà
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Abel Escribà
For some political leaders losing power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. During the period 1946–2004, 47% of dictators have been jailed, killed, or had to go into exile as a consequence of losing power. The possibility that such punishment occurs can shape and condition present-time decisions rulers make. This article investigates the factors which may affect the fate of outgoing dictators. I find that regime types determine, to a high extent, the fate of rulers as regimes shape internal dynamics and incentives and decisively affect the way rulers are replaced. Due to the lack of regularized succession procedures and to the concentration of power and patronage-based loyalty, personalist leaders are more likely to be killed and to go into exile upon their exit than other autocrats. Military and personalist leaders are also more likely to be imprisoned than monarchs or rulers of single-party regimes. If replaced by democracies, rulers of party and military regimes have a much higher likelihood of not being punished than personalists. It is also found that performance matters for explaining what happens to rulers after the loss of power. Economic crises and defeats increase the likelihood that an authoritarian ruler is imprisoned.