The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance
The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance
复制标题
自我：自然主义、意识和第一人称立场
DOI：
10.5860/choice.50-4925
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Ganeri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Ganeri
什么是第一人称视角一个人对自己的第一个人的观念是否与自己作为一个物理存在的观念相冲突？如果有冲突，如何解决？在这本书中，一种新的方式来解决这些问题，从第一个千年印度的自我理论中汲取灵感，制定。这些哲学家并不认为第一人称立场与自然相冲突--他们的自然观不是科学自然主义，而是不排斥规范的自由自然主义。一个广泛的思想进行了探讨：自反性的自我表征，心理文件，和主观意识的准主体分析;作为转化的出现理论;体现和身体自我的想法;自我统一的情感的中心地位。佛教声称没有自我，这太容易假设自我必须是什么。相反，本书认为，自我是自我呈现和规范性声明之间的谈判，是一种基于无意识的交易。沉浸、参与和协调共同构成了自我，第一人称立场同时存在、参与和承保。一切都与自然的理念相和谐。
What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? In this book a new way to address those questions, drawing inspiration from theories about the self in first millennial India, is formulated. These philosophers do not regard the first‐person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature not that of scientific naturalism but rather a liberal naturalism non‐exclusive of the normative. A wide range of ideas are explored: reflexive self‐representation, mental files, and quasi‐subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. This book argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self‐presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first‐person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.