Economics of antipoaching enforcement and the ivory trade ban
Economics of antipoaching enforcement and the ivory trade ban
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DOI：
10.2307/1244594
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发表时间：
1999-05-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
van Kooten, GC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bulte, EH;van Kooten, GC
大象保护的模型，包括非法偷猎，执法工作，和法律的扑杀是用来分析执法和大象种群的替代政策，有和没有法律的象牙贸易。与以前的理论模型一致，禁止贸易可能会增加或减少均衡库存。作为一个实证应用，赞比亚的信息，沿着与敏感性分析，被用来表明，象牙贸易禁令是更有效地保护非洲象（Loxodonta africana）比在允许开放贸易。然而，在所有情况下，目前的大象数量可能超过了范围国家所认为的最佳水平，预计大象数量可能会进一步减少。
A model of elephant conservation that includes illegal poaching, enforcement effort, and legal culling is used to analyze enforcement and elephant populations for alternative policies, with and without legal trade in ivory. Consistent with previous theoretical models, banning trade may increase or decrease equilibrium stocks. As an empirical application, information for Zambia, along with sensitivity analysis, are used to show that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) than in permitting open trade. However, in all situations, current elephant populations likely exceed optimal levels as perceived by the range states, and further reductions in elephant numbers might be expected.