Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking
Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking
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DOI：
10.1103/physrevlett.97.258103
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发表时间：
2006-12-22
影响因子：
8.6
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pacheco, Jorge M.;Traulsen, Arne;Nowak, Martin A.
我们引入了一个模型，在该模型中，个体寻求与他人新的互动的速度不同，从而做出建模为一般对称两人游戏的理性决策。一旦两个人之间建立了联系，就会评估该联系的生产力。链接可以以不同的速率断开。我们提供了有限情况的分析结果，其中链接动力学比进化动力学快得多，反之亦然，并展示了形成新链接或切断不方便链接的个体能力如何映射到不同博弈下混合良好群体中的策略进化问题。对于中间范围，我们以数值方式研究了由这两个时间尺度确定的详细相互作用，并表明分析结果的有效性范围扩展到比预期更广泛的时间尺度比率。
We introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected.