Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review
Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review
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法律学术中判断和决策的行为理论：文献综述
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发表时间：
1998
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通讯作者：
Donald C. Langevoort
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作者：
Donald C. Langevoort
I.引言几乎所有有趣的法律的问题都需要对人类行为的准确预测才能得到满意的解决。法官、政策制定者和学者在评估替代规则、政策或程序的可取性时，都会援引个人和社会行为的心理模型。当代法律的学术界已经认识到，如果这些预测是天真和直觉的，没有任何强有力的经验基础，它们很容易受到错误和意识形态偏见的影响。因此，当规范性的要求被提出时，人们会期望一些更严格的东西，社会科学在法律的话语中的地位已经扩大，以满足这种期望。社会科学的三个分支--经济学、心理学和社会学--在预测人类日常行为方面提供了最明显的帮助，每一个分支都对法律的学术产生了公认的影响。法律的现实主义者--最著名的是杰罗姆弗兰克--在半个世纪前就非常认真地对待心理学;“社会学法学”在此后不久就开始崭露头角，法律和社会研究仍然非常引人注目。但正如许多人经常说的那样，心理学和社会学都无法产生一个统一的行为模型，与经济学家的效用最大化理性行为者的简单性，优雅性和可测试性相媲美。出于这个原因（可能还有其他原因），理性行为者模型开始主导关于“正常”个人和群体如何应对法律的激励的预测。到20世纪70年代末和80年代初，法律和经济学是一种基于社会科学的方法，对法律的思维产生了真正普遍的影响。在一段时间内，“法律和心理学”主要是研究人口的边缘部分，如犯罪精神病患者，或专门的程序科目，如陪审团行为和目击者回忆。可以肯定的是，心理学长期以来一直认为人类行为是复杂的和偶然的，认知失调理论（更不用说广泛的精神分析结构）已经有一段时间可以用来质疑社会中其他正常成员的决策。在认知和社会心理学中。阿莫斯·特沃斯基（Amos Tversky）、丹尼尔·卡尼曼（Daniel Kahneman）、希勒尔·艾因霍恩（Hillel Einhorn）、罗宾·霍加斯（Robin Hogarth）、阿里·克鲁格兰斯基（Arie Kruglanski）、李·罗斯（Lee Ross）、理查德·塞勒（Richard Thaler）等研究人员的研究表明，存在着系统性、可预测性和其他偏离理性决策过程的因素，因此可以用相当严格的标准进行建模和检验。[8]这场争论还远未解决。[9]传统经济学仍然是一门非常强大的学科，但在经济学内部，人们越来越愿意（有时不情愿，有时不情愿）认真对待心理学家的经验主张--即使是在市场环境中。用赫伯特·西蒙的说法，交易成本经济学认为经济行为者的理性是“有限的”，有限理性可以包括认知缺陷和信息限制。因此，“行为经济学”已经成为经济学中一个被接受的分支学科，最好的经济学和金融学期刊上的论文越来越倾向于对心理学文献进行非讽刺性的引用。这一跨学科融合的一个突出例证是，1997年5月出版的《经济学季刊》（Quarterly Journal of Economics）专门介绍了已故的行为决策理论先驱阿莫斯·特沃斯基（Amos Tversky）的工作。…
I. INTRODUCTION Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predictions about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily. Judges, policymakers, and academics invoke mental models of individual and social behavior whenever they estimate the desirability of alternative rules, policies, or procedures. Contemporary legal scholarship has come to recognize that if these predictions are naive and intuitive, without any strong empirical grounding, they are susceptible to error and ideological bias. Something more rigorous is thus expected when normative claims are advanced, and the place of the social sciences has expanded in legal discourse to satisfy this expectation.l Three branches of the social sciences-economics, psychology, and sociology-offer the most obvious assistance in predicting everyday human behavior, and each has a well-recognized history of influence on legal scholarship. The legal realists-most notably, Jerome Frank-took psychology quite seriously half a century ago; "sociological jurisprudence" came to prominence shortly thereafter, and law and society studies are still highly visible. But as many have said so often, both psychology and sociology have suffered from the inability to generate a unified behavioral model rivaling the simplicity, elegance, and testability of the economist's utilitymaximizing rational actor. For this reason (and probably a host of otherss), the rational actor model came to dominate predictions about how "normal" persons and groups respond to legal incentives. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, law and economics was the one social science-based approach to have a truly pervasive effect on legal thinking. "Law and psychology" for some time was largely the study of either marginal segments of the population, such as the criminally insane, or specialized procedural subjects like jury behavior and eyewitness recall.4 At roughly the same time that economics was rapidly diffusing into law,5 work by cognitive and social psychologists challenging the orthodox presumption of rational human behavior was becoming more prominent in the social sciences. To be sure, psychology has long claimed that human behavior is complex and contingent, and theories like cognitive dissonance (not to mention a broad range of psychoanalytic constructs) have for some time been available to question the decision making of otherwise normal members of society.e But the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s brought distinct focus and attention to the new subdiscipline of "behavioral decision theory" within cognitive and social psychology. Work by researchers such as Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Hillel Einhorn, Robin Hogarth, Arie Kruglanski, Lee Ross, Richard Thaler, and many others suggested that there are heuristics, biases, and other departures from rational decision-making processes that are systematic and predictable and can thus be modeled and tested with a fair degree of rigor.7 The challenge to orthodox economic theory was plain, and a debate between the disciplines quickly began.8 This debate is still far from resolved.9 Conventional economics remains an extraordinarily powerful discipline, but within economics there is an increasing willingness (sometimes grudging, sometimes not) to take the psychologists' empirical claims seriously-even in market settings. Transaction cost economics accepts that the rationality of economic actors is "bounded," to use Herbert Simon's phraseology, and bounded rationality can include cognitive imperfection as well as informational limits.lo "Behavioral economics" has become an accepted subdiscipline within economics, and papers in the best economics and finance journals are more and more apt to make unsarcastic reference to the psychological literature. A pointed illustration of this interdisciplinary accomodation is the venerable Quarterly Journal of Economics' dedication of its May 1997 issue to the work of the late Amos Tversky, who pioneered behavioral decision theory. …