A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms

A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms
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多产品垄断企业最优定价的监管调整过程

DOI:
10.2307/3003324
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发表时间:
1979
期刊:
The Bell Journal of Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
J. Finsinger
J. Finsinger
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
I. Vogelsang;J. Finsinger

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

本文描述了一种激励机制,该机制被证明可以强制多产品垄断企业使用拉姆齐价格。给出的约束条件很简单。它将对管理机构的信息要求限制在公司的簿记数据上。它的执行很容易受到外部法院或审计员的控制。因此,这一过程利用了无形之手的属性,将福利优化的工作量从监管机构转移到受监管的公司。
This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies. The constraint given is simple. It limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to bookkeeping data of the firm. Its implementation could be easily controlled by outside courts or auditors. The process, therefore, makes use of invisible hand properties shifting the workload of welfare optimization from the regulatory agency to the regulated firm.