COLLATERAL, LOAN QUALITY, AND BANK RISK
COLLATERAL, LOAN QUALITY, AND BANK RISK
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-3932(90)90042-3
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发表时间：
1990-01-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
UDELL, GF
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BERGER, AN;UDELL, GF
大多数商业贷款都是有担保的，但人们对抵押品与信用风险之间的关系知之甚少。一些理论研究发现，当借款人拥有有关风险的私人信息时，风险最低的借款人倾向于抵押抵押品。相比之下，传统观点认为，当风险可观察时，风险最高的借款人倾向于抵押抵押品。另一个问题是，有担保贷款（相对于有担保借款人）是否比无担保贷款更安全或更风险更大。这里提供的经验证据强烈表明，抵押品通常与风险较高的借款人、风险较高的贷款和风险较高的银行相关。
Most commercial loans are made on a secured basis, yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk. Several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk, the lowest-risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral. In contrast, conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable, the highest-risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral. An additional issue is whether secured loans (as opposed to secured borrowers) tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans. Empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers, riskier loans and riskier banks.