Relative Performance or Team Evaluation? Optimal Contracts for Other-Regarding Agents
Relative Performance or Team Evaluation? Optimal Contracts for Other-Regarding Agents
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1014030
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发表时间：
2010-11
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Björn Bartling
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Björn Bartling
本文推导了具有其他偏好的代理人的最优激励契约。它为凭经验观察到的相对绩效评估的缺乏提供了行为解释。我们分析了委托人-多代理人模型，并假设代理人厌恶不平等或寻求地位。我们表明，即使代理人的绩效指标呈正相关，使得相对绩效评估对于纯粹自利的代理人来说是最优的，并且即使相对绩效评估提供了额外的激励来提供努力（如果代理人有其他方面的偏好），团队合同也可以是最优的。此外，与纯粹自利代理人的合同相比，有关其他代理人的最优激励合同的效力可能较低。
This paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other-regarding preferences. It offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance evaluation. We analyze a principal-multi agent model and assume that agents are inequity averse or status seeking. We show that team contracts can be optimal even if the agents' performance measures are positively correlated such that relative performance evaluation would be optimal with purely self-interested agents and even though relative performance evaluation provides additional incentives to provide effort if agents have other-regarding preferences. Furthermore, optimal incentive contracts for other-regarding agents can be low-powered as compared to contracts for purely self-interested agents.