Democracy, Accountability, and Representation: Subject Index
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation: Subject Index
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民主、问责制和代表性：主题索引
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发表时间：
1999
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通讯作者：
Bernard Manin
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作者：
A. Przeworski;S. Stokes;Bernard Manin
本书探讨了民主制度特有的问责机制是否足以促使代表们按照被代表者的最佳利益行事。本卷第一部分着重于选举的作用，区分选举可能产生代表性的不同方式。第二部分是关于政府与议会之间以及政府与官僚机构之间的制衡作用。这卷的贡献者，所有在美国和比较政治学和政治理论领域的领先学者，解决的问题，如，选举是否诱导政府采取行动的公民的利益。民主国家的政治家在未来的选举中是否对选民负责？如果是这样，问责是否会促使政治家代表公民？问责是限制还是扩大政府的行动范围？违反竞选授权的政府有代表性吗？总的来说，这些文章结合了联合收割机理论讨论，博弈论模型，案例研究和统计分析，在一个共同的分析方法和标准化的术语。经验材料来自已确立的民主国家以及新的民主国家。经济发展是否有利于政治民主？民主促进还是阻碍物质福利？这两个问题是通过研究1950年至1990年期间135个国家的经验来研究的。描述性信息，统计分析和历史叙述交织在一起，以了解政治制度的动态及其对经济发展的影响。这些经常令人惊讶的发现消除了民主与发展之间权衡的任何概念。经济发展不会产生民主，但民主更有可能在富裕社会中生存。
This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies. Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experiences of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development. The often surprising findings dispel any notion of a tradeoff between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies.