Cognitive Theory and Plea-Bargaining
Cognitive Theory and Plea-Bargaining
复制标题
认知理论与辩诉交易
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Rebecca K. Helm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rebecca K. Helm
现在刑事司法系统中的定罪绝大多数是通过认罪进行的。这主要是由于“辩诉交易”制度，在这种制度下，被告因认罪而受到的指控和刑罚往往比他们在审判中被定罪时受到的指控和刑罚轻得多。在这种情况下，被告必须就是否认罪或接受审判做出复杂的决定。本文利用认知理论和实证研究来确定当前认罪制度中的三个潜在弱点：(a) 提供认罪的激励措施可能会以一种可能具有心理强制作用的方式凌驾于事实有罪或无罪的考虑之上； (b) 当无辜者得不到充分保护时，认知上倾向于认罪的群体； (c) 启发法和偏见可能会影响抗辩决定。在认知理论和决策研究的指导下，可能会发生旨在减少这些问题的潜在政策变化。
Convictions in the criminal justice system now overwhelmingly occur by guilty plea. This is largely due to the “plea-bargaining” system in which the charge and sentence defendants receive as a result of pleading guilty is frequently much less severe than the charge and sentence that they would receive if convicted at trial. In this context, defendants must make complex decisions about whether to plead guilty or go to trial. This article draws on cognitive theory and empirical research to identify three potential weaknesses in the current plea system: (a) incentives offered to plead are likely to override considerations of factual guilt or innocence in a way that may be psychologically coercive; (b) groups that are cognitively disposed to pleading guilty when innocent are being offered insufficient protection; and (c) heuristics and biases are likely to influence plea decisions. Potential policy change to reduce these problems, informed by cognitive theory and decision-making research, then follow.