Restricting Preservation: A Response to Hill
Restricting Preservation: A Response to Hill
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限制保护：对希尔的回应
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
Richard Bradley
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作者：
Richard Bradley
布赖恩·希尔主张对保存条件的限制，这是基于认识的概念，而不是逻辑的一致性。在这个答复中，我考虑了认识一致性的可能标准，并建议一个自然的候选人导致比希尔提出的更严格的限制。我还质疑他提出的限制是否是必要的或足够的，以避免不可能的结果的保存条件，这表明它是信念扩张的特点，在年度股东大会的框架，这是真实的来源的问题。最后，我利用信念破坏的概念来支持问题的不同解决方案。
Brian Hill argues for a restriction of the Preservation condition that is based on a notion of epistemic, as opposed to logical, consistency. In this reply I consider possible criteria for epistemic consistency and suggest that a natural candidate for one leads to a more severe restriction on the Preservation condition than Hill proposes. I also question whether his proposed restriction is either necessary or sufficient to avoid the impossibility results for the Preservation condition, suggesting that it is the way in which belief expansion is characterized within the AGM framework that is the real source of the problem. Finally, I draw on the notion of belief undermining to support a different resolution of the problem.