Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
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无需排序假设的评分规则的公理推导
DOI：
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
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通讯作者：
R. Myerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Myerson
史密斯（Smith，1973）和杨（Young，1975）对评分规则的早期推导，假设选民只能在他或她的选票上表达备选方案的等级排序。本文表明，评分规则可以推导出没有这种排序的假设。它表明，一个投票规则必须是一个评分规则，如果它满足三个基本公理：强化，压倒性多数，和中立。其他范围和非反转公理也进行了讨论。
Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith (1973) and Young (1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.