A game-theoretic approach for power systems defense against dynamic cyber-attacks
A game-theoretic approach for power systems defense against dynamic cyber-attacks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105432
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发表时间：
2020-02
影响因子：
5.2
通讯作者：
Saqib Hasan;A. Dubey;G. Karsai;X. Koutsoukos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Saqib Hasan;A. Dubey;G. Karsai;X. Koutsoukos
当今电网的技术进步带来了新的漏洞，并增加了网络攻击的潜在攻击面，这可能严重影响电网的恢复能力。网络攻击在数量和复杂性上都在增加，这些攻击可以按时间顺序进行战略性组织（动态攻击），它们可以在不同的时刻进行实例化。攻击的时间顺序使我们能够发现那些可能导致严重系统损坏的攻击组合，但由于缺乏动态攻击模型，这一概念尚未得到探讨。受此启发，我们考虑了一个博弈论的方法来设计一个新的攻击者防御模型的电力系统。在这里，攻击者可以战略性地识别关键变电站及其保护组件可以被攻击的时间顺序，以便最大化整个系统的损害。然而，防御者可以智能地识别要保护的关键变电站，使得可以最小化系统损害。我们将开发的算法应用到IEEE-39和57总线系统有限的攻击者/防御者的预算。我们的研究结果表明，这些模型在提高系统的弹性下的动态攻击的有效性。
Technological advancements in today’s electrical grids give rise to new vulnerabilities and increase the potential attack surface for cyber-attacks that can severely affect the resilience of the grid. Cyber-attacks are increasing both in number as well as sophistication and these attacks can be strategically organized in chronological order (dynamic attacks), where they can be instantiated at different time instants. The chronological order of attacks enables us to uncover those attack combinations that can cause severe system damage but this concept remained unexplored due to the lack of dynamic attack models. Motivated by the idea, we consider a game-theoretic approach to design a new attacker-defender model for power systems. Here, the attacker can strategically identify the chronological order in which the critical substations and their protection assemblies can be attacked in order to maximize the overall system damage. However, the defender can intelligently identify the critical substations to protect such that the system damage can be minimized. We apply the developed algorithms to the IEEE-39 and 57 bus systems with finite attacker/defender budgets. Our results show the effectiveness of these models in improving the system resilience under dynamic attacks.