Econometric Analysisof Collusive Behaviorin a Soft‐Drink Market
Econometric Analysisof Collusive Behaviorin a Soft‐Drink Market
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软饮料市场共谋行为的计量经济学分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Q. Vuong
中科院分区：
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作者：
F. Gasmi;J. Laffont;Q. Vuong
本文提出了一种实证方法，研究在双寡头垄断的差异化市场中，价格和广告这两个战略变量上的各种（隐性或显性）合谋行为。除了纳什或Stackelberg行为，我们认为两个变量的合谋，合谋的一个变量和竞争的其他等，使用数据的可口可乐和百事可乐市场从1968年至1986年，充分的信息最大似然估计的成本和需求函数，允许各种合谋行为。合谋假设没有被拒绝，最好的形式的合谋行为是通过非嵌套测试程序选择。使用最好的模型，勒纳指数计算两个双寡头提供市场势力的摘要措施。最后，我们的方法进行了对比，与结构变化的方法，并给出了上级的结果。版权所有1992年由麻省理工学院出版社。
This paper proposes an empirical methodology for studying various (implicit or explicit) collusive behavior on two strategic variables, which are price and advertising, in a differentiated market dominated by a duopoly. In addition to Nash or Stackelberg behaviors, we consider collusion on both variables, collusion on one variable and competition on the other, etc. Using data on the Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola markets from 1968 to 1986, full information maximum likelihood estimation of cost and demand functions are obtained allowing for various collusive behaviors. The collusive hypothesis is not rejected, and the best form of collusive behavior is selected via nonnested testing procedures. Using the best model, Lerner indices are computed for both duopolists to provide summary measures of market power. Finally, our approach is contrasted with the conjectural variation approach and is shown to give superior results. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.