Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly with Relative Profit-Maximizers
Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly with Relative Profit-Maximizers
复制标题
在相对利润最大化的混合双头垄断中，有偏见的管理者作为战略承诺
DOI：
10.1007/s10842-015-0198-4
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
久留島潤;富田治芳;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本研究分析了一个由社会福利最大化的上市公司和一个相对利润最大化的私人公司组成的混合双寡头垄断，其中两家公司的所有者雇佣相对利润最大化的管理者，他们面对的市场规模有偏见。特别地，我们探讨了数量竞争，它给出的结果不同于标准的混合双寡头垄断（中村，Theor Econ Lett 4（3），889-896，2014 a）中所有权和经营权之间的区别，后者遵循了（Englmaier，and Reisinger，Manag Decis Econ 35（5），350-356，2013）的方法。更准确地说，当我们把每个企业的相对业绩的重要程度引入到数量竞争中时，我们看到，当重要程度相对较高时，私人企业的所有者会变成一个不那么积极的管理者，这与经典的战略管理授权的运作方式类似。此外，我们认为，每个公司的相对业绩的积极性的重要性程度的增加，由公共和私人公司聘请的管理人员的影响。此外，我们探讨的情况下，所有者雇用他的经理与工资的基础上的社会福利。
This study analyzes a mixed duopoly composed of a social welfare-maximizing public firm and a relative profit-maximizing private firm wherein the owners of both firms hire relative profit-maximizing managers biased with respect to the market size they face. In particular, we explore the quantity competition that gives a result different from that obtained in a standard mixed duopoly that differentiates between ownership and management, as considered by (Nakamura, Theor Econ Lett 4(3), 889–896, 2014a), which follows the approach of (Englmaier, and Reisinger, Manag Decis Econ 35(5), 350–356, 2013). More precisely, when we introduce the degree of importance of each firm’s relative performance into quantity competition, we see that the owner of the private firm reverts to a less aggressive manager when the degree of importance is relatively high, which is similar to how the classical strategic managerial delegation works. Furthermore, we consider the influence of an increase in degree of importance of each firm’s relative performance on the aggressiveness of managers hired by both the public and private firm. Moreover, we explore the case in which the owner hires his manager with salary based on social welfare.