Constant-Round Group Key Exchange from the Ring-LWE Assumption
Constant-Round Group Key Exchange from the Ring-LWE Assumption
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_11
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发表时间：
2019-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Daniel Apon;Dana Dachman-Soled;Huijing Gong;Jonathan Katz
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文献类型：
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作者：
Daniel Apon;Dana Dachman-Soled;Huijing Gong;Jonathan Katz
组密钥交换协议允许一组 N 方通过公共网络进行通信来就共享密钥达成一致。多年来，针对此问题提出了许多解决方案，其中大部分基于 Diffie-Hellman（两方）密钥交换的变体。然而，据我们所知，几乎没有研究候选后量子组密钥交换协议的工作。在这里，我们基于 Ring-LWE 问题的难度，提出了一种用于未经身份验证的组密钥交换的常轮协议（即，具有针对被动窃听者的安全性）。通过使用任何后量子签名方案应用 Katz-Yung 编译器，我们获得了一个（可扩展的）协议，用于具有后量子安全性的经过身份验证的组密钥交换。我们的协议是通过将 Burmester-Desmedt 协议推广到 Ring-LWE 设置而构建的，这需要解决一些技术挑战。
Group key-exchange protocols allow a set ofNparties to agree on a shared, secret key by communicating over a public network. A number of solutions to this problem have been proposed over the years, mostly based on variants of Diffie-Hellman (two-party) key exchange. To the best of our knowledge, however, there has been almost no work looking at candidatepost-quantumgroup key-exchange protocols.Here, we propose a constant-round protocol for unauthenticated group key exchange (i.e., with security against a passive eavesdropper) based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem. By applying the Katz-Yung compiler using any post-quantum signature scheme, we obtain a (scalable) protocol forauthenticatedgroup key exchange with post-quantum security. Our protocol is constructed by generalizing the Burmester-Desmedt protocol to the Ring-LWE setting, which requires addressing several technical challenges.