On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
复制标题
关于销售多个独立分布的商品的收入最大化
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
A. Yao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xinye Li;A. Yao
考虑收入最大化的问题，其中单个卖家想向单个买家出售K不同的物品，该商品对案件的分配价值独立分发了。较大的问题从那以后一直是研究工作的主题，哈特和尼桑分析了两个简单的机制：分别出售这些物品，或者以单一的束缚出售表明，出售至少保证最佳收入的一部分；对于分配的物品，捆绑包的最佳收入至少是最佳收入的一小部分。对于相同分布的物品，捆绑包至少持续的最佳收入分数。 HART和NISAN的结果对任意概率分布有效，而我们的结果也对其他有趣的问题有影响。
Consider the revenue-maximizing problem in which a single seller wants to sell k different items to a single buyer, who has independently distributed values for the items with additive valuation. The case was completely resolved by Myerson’s classical work in 1981, whereas for larger k the problem has been the subject of much research efforts ever since. Recently, Hart and Nisan analyzed two simple mechanisms: selling the items separately, or selling them as a single bundle. They showed that selling separately guarantees at least a fraction of the optimal revenue; and for identically distributed items, bundling yields at least a fraction of the optimal revenue. In this paper, we prove that selling separately guarantees at least fraction of the optimal revenue, whereas for identically distributed items, bundling yields at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. These bounds are tight (up to a constant factor), settling the open questions raised by Hart and Nisan. The results are valid for arbitrary probability distributions without restrictions. Our results also have implications on other interesting issues, such as monotonicity and randomization of selling mechanisms.