Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games
Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games
复制标题
零和博弈中说服者的竞争
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.4241719
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Zhihan Cui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dilip Ravindran;Zhihan Cui
我们使用条件独立实验研究了具有多个发送者的贝叶斯说服游戏。发送者对透露的信息有零和偏好。我们描述了何时不能在任何均衡中汇集一组状态，特别是当该状态在每个均衡中（完全）揭示时。当且仅当发送者效用函数足够非线性时，状态必须在每个均衡中完全揭示。在二元状态的情况下，当且仅当某个发送者具有不平凡的偏好时，状态才会在每个均衡中被完全揭示。我们的结论是，“大多数”零和发件人偏好会导致完全揭露。
We study a Bayesian Persuasion game with multiple senders employing conditionally independent experiments. Senders have zero-sum preferences over what information is revealed. We characterize when a set of states cannot be pooled in any equilibrium, and in particular, when the state is (fully) revealed in every equilibrium. The state must be fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender utility functions are sufficiently nonlinear. In the binary-state case, the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if some sender has nontrivial preferences. Our takeaway is that `most' zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation.