EPISTEMIC AGENCY: SOME DOUBTS
EPISTEMIC AGENCY: SOME DOUBTS
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认知机构：一些疑问
DOI：
10.1111/phis.12009
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Kieran Setiya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kieran Setiya
许多哲学家认为，我们行使某种形式的认知代理：我们可以是积极的，而不是被动的，与我们的信仰有关。这种信念有不同的表达方式。有时，它涉及到对康德的自发思想的诉求。与知觉不同，知觉是一种接受能力，理解是自发的，在某种程度上是自由的，尽管它的自由并不与理性的决定相反，而是在于理性的决定1在其他时候，所谓的活跃是推理。有代表性的讨论将推断结论视为“一种个人层面的、有意识的、自愿的心理行为”(博戈斯语，即将发表：§2)。还有一些人把重点放在“判决[作为]行动，通常是有理由的”(Peacocke 1999：19)。“做出判断是形成信仰(或在重新评估时认可它)的基本方式。判断是一种有意识的理性活动，是有理由的，这些理由与判断的根本目标有关，它的目标是真理”(Peacocke 1999：238)2最后，一些人坚持认为“相信本身是一种代理练习，主体对此承担着一种特有的代理责任”(Boyle 2011a：121)。3尽管相信不是我们生活中的一个事件或过程，而是我们有时所处的一种状态或状况。
Many philosophers hold that we exercise some form of epistemic agency: that we can be active, rather than passive, in relation to our beliefs. This conviction is expressed in various ways. Sometimes, it involves appeal to the Kantian idea of spontaneity. Unlike perception, which is a receptive faculty, the understanding is spontaneous and in a certain way free, though its freedom does not contrast with, but rather consists in, determination by reason.1 At other times, what is said to be active is inference. A representative discussion treats inferring a conclusion as "a person-level, conscious, voluntary mental action" (Boghossian forthcoming: §2). Still others focus on "judgements [as] actions, normally done for reasons" (Peacocke 1999: 19). "To make a judgement is the fundamental way to form a belief (or to endorse it when it is being reassessed). Judgement is a conscious rational activity, done for reasons, where these reasons are answerable to a fundamental goal of judgement, that it aims at truth" (Peacocke 1999: 238).2 Finally, some insist that "believing itself is an exercise of agency, one for which the subject bears a characteristically agential sort of responsibility" (Boyle 2011a: 121).3 This despite the fact that believing is not an event or process in our lives, but a state or condition we are sometimes in.