A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements1
A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements1
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概率陈述的证伪规则1
DOI：
10.1093/bjps/22.3.231
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发表时间：
1971
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Gillies
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Gillies
我本文的目的是讨论波普尔在《科学发现的逻辑》第八章中提出的一个问题。这个问题可以简单解释一下。波普尔认为，科学理论应该能够被证据证伪。现在，统计理论出现在许多著名的科学领域。然而，严格来说，它们并不能通过实践中用于测试它们的频率证据来证伪。正如波普尔本人所说（[8]，第 146 页）：
MY AIM in this paper is to discuss a problem raised by Popper in chapter vIII of the Logic of Scientific Discovery. This problem can be simply explained. According to Popper a scientific theory should be capable of being falsified by evidence. Now statistical theories appear in much reputable science; yet they are not, strictly speaking, falsifiable by the frequency evidence which is used in practice to test them. As Popper himself puts it ([8], p. 146):