Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization
Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization
复制标题
社会公益分配：效用最大化的审计机制
DOI：
10.1145/3328526.3329623
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kevin Leyton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Taylor Lundy;Alexander Wei;Hu Fu;S. Kominers;Kevin Leyton
我们考虑一个非营利组织(“中心”)的问题，它必须根据代理商报告的需求预测，在子公司(“代理商”)之间分配资源，目的是最大化社会公益(代理商对分配的估值减去强加给他们的任何付款)。我们调查了非营利性环境的一个共同特征的影响：中心有能力审计获得拨款的代理，将他们的实际消费与报告的预测进行比较。我们发现，审计增加了效用最大化机制的力量，无论是在单位需求设置中还是在单位需求设置之外：在单位需求设置中，我们考虑将自己限制在过去工作中研究的分配函数上，并允许分配函数变化；在单位需求之外，我们采用VCG分配，但修改了支付规则。我们的最终目标是展示如何利用审计机制在无法支付的重复分配问题中最大化效用；我们展示了如何利用减少未来分配来取代货币支付的威胁，将任何静态审计机制转变为在这样的环境中运行。
We consider the problem of a nonprofit organization ("center") that must divide resources among subsidiaries ("agents"), based on agents' reported demand forecasts, with the aim of maximizing social good (agents' valuations for the allocation minus any payments that are imposed on them). We investigate the impact of a common feature of the nonprofit setting: the center's ability to audit agents who receive allocations, comparing their actual consumption with their reported forecasts. We show that auditing increases the power of mechanisms for utility maximization, both in unit-demand settings and beyond: in unit-demand settings, we consider both constraining ourselves to an allocation function studied in past work and allowing the allocation function to vary; beyond unit demand, we adopt the VCG allocation but modify the payment rule. Our ultimate goal is to show how to leverage auditing mechanisms to maximize utility in repeated allocation problems where payments are not possible; we show how any static auditing mechanism can be transformed to operate in such a setting, using the threat of reduced future allocations in place of monetary payments.
通过人工货币从货币机制设计到非货币机制设计
DOI：
10.1145/3033274.3085140
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC
影响因子：
--
作者：
Gorokh, Artur;Banerjee, Siddhartha;Iyer, Krishnamurthy
通讯作者：
Iyer, Krishnamurthy