Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation

Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation
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DOI:
10.1007/s11097-009-9136-4
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发表时间:
2009-12-01
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
De Jaegher, Hanne
De Jaegher, Hanne
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Fuchs, Thomas;De Jaegher, Hanne

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当前的社会认知理论主要基于表征主义观点。此外,他们关注的是理解他人的一个相当复杂和有限的方面,即我们如何通过代表他人的心理状态来预测和解释他人的行为。对“社交大脑”的研究也青睐第三人称的社会认知范式,将其视为对他人行为的被动观察,并将其归因于个体大脑中的推理、模拟或投射过程。在本文中,我们提出了社会理解的概念,作为一个持续的、动态的参与意义建构和相互融合的过程。这个过程可以被描述为(1)从动态代理系统的角度来看,作为两个具体代理的交互和协调; (2)从现象学的角度来看,作为一种相互结合,即两个参与者的生命体延伸并形成共同的身体间性的过程。有人认为,主体间性并不是破译或模拟他人运动的单独任务,而是意味着进入具体互动的过程并通过它产生共同意义。这种方法将通过对幼儿期主要二元互动的分析来进一步说明。
Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others' behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the 'social brain' has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others' behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity, it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of primary dyadic interaction in early childhood.