The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
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需求承诺讨价还价，滚雪球式合作
DOI：
10.1007/bf01221203
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Eyal Winter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Eyal Winter
研究了合作规模收益递增的多人讨价还价模型。我们表明，对于这样的游戏（子博弈完美）的均衡行为导致的支付分布接近夏普利值的货币单位接近0。子博弈一致性和策略均衡是分析的主要工具。最后，将该模型应用于一个公共物品消费问题的研究。
A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption.