Supplier Encroachment under Asymmetric Information
Supplier Encroachment under Asymmetric Information
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2018432
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发表时间：
2012-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Z. Li;S. Gilbert;Guoming Lai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Z. Li;S. Gilbert;Guoming Lai
先前的文献表明，对于对称信息环境，供应商侵入供应商的市场可以减轻双重边缘化，使供应商和供应商都受益。本文将供应商侵权行为的调查扩展到供应商可能比供应商更了解的环境中。我们发现，供应商的直接渠道的启动可能会导致成本的信号行为的一部分，在市场规模小的时候，他减少了他的订货量。这种向下的扭曲会放大双重边缘化。因此，除了供应商和分销商的“双赢”和“双赢”结果外，供应商侵占还可能导致“双输”和“双输”结果，特别是当分销商在销售过程中具有显著的效率优势，并且大市场的先验概率较低时。我们进一步探讨了这些发现对供应链信息管理的影响。补充传统的理解，我们表明，有能力侵占，供应商可能更愿意出售给一个更好的知情或不知情的销售在不同的情况下。另一方面，作为供应商发展侵占能力的结果，供应商可能选择不发展先进的信息能力，或者可能变得更愿意找到一种合理地共享其信息的方法。这篇论文被运营管理部门的Yossi Aviv接受。
Prior literature has shown that, for a symmetric information setting, supplier encroachment into a reseller's market can mitigate double marginalization and benefit both the supplier and the reseller. This paper extends the investigation of supplier encroachment to the environment where the reseller might be better informed than the supplier. We find that the launch of the supplier's direct channel can result in costly signaling behavior on the part of the reseller, in which he reduces his order quantity when the market size is small. Such a downward order distortion can amplify double marginalization. As a result, in addition to the “win--win” and “win--lose” outcomes for the supplier and the reseller, supplier encroachment can also lead to “lose--lose” and “lose--win” outcomes, particularly when the reseller has a significant efficiency advantage in the selling process and the prior probability of a large market is low. We further explore the implications of those findings for information management in supply chains. Complementing the conventional understanding, we show that with the ability to encroach, the supplier may prefer to sell to either a better informed or an uninformed reseller in different scenarios. On the other hand, as a result of a supplier developing encroachment capability, a reseller either may choose not to develop an advanced informational capability or may become more willing to find a means of credibly sharing his information. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.