Short-Term Managerial Contracts and Cartels
Short-Term Managerial Contracts and Cartels
复制标题
短期管理合同和卡特尔
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. A. Han
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. A. Han
本文展示了与长期雇佣合同相比，一系列常见的短期CEO雇佣合同如何提高卡特尔的稳定性。当经理的短期任命被续签时，当且仅当公司达到一定的利润目标时，那么：(I)合谋的叛逃导致更好的公司业绩，从而减少被解雇的机会，而(Ii)未来的惩罚导致更差的公司业绩，从而增加未来被解雇的机会。这种再就业权衡的引入与通常的货币权衡交织在一起，可以提高卡特尔的稳定性。研究固定薪酬和浮动薪酬的影响，我发现固定薪酬可以促进与短期合同的串通，而不会影响长期合同的卡特尔稳定性。此外，该模型的一个扩展表明，短期、可续订的合同可能是周期性合谋定价的来源。最后，从公司融资的角度解释结果表明，债务融资的公司可以形成比股权融资的公司更稳定的卡特尔。
This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment contracts can improve cartel stability compared to a long-term employment contract. When a manager’s short-term appointment is renewed if and only if the firm hits a certain profit target, then (i) defection from collusion results in superior firm performance, thus reducing the chance of being fired, while (ii) future punishment results in inferior firm performance, thus increasing the chance of being fired in the future. The introduction of this re-employment tradeoff intertwines with the usual monetary tradeoff and can improve cartel stability. Studying the impact of fixed versus variable salary components, I find that fixed components can facilitate collusion with a short-term contract, while not affecting cartel stability with a long-term contract. Moreover, an extension of the model shows that short-term, renewable contracts can be a source of cyclical collusive pricing. Finally, interpreting the results in light of firm financing suggests that debt-financed firms can form more-stable cartels than equity-financed firms.
加法模型：扩展和相关模型
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199857944.013.007
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
Mammen;E. Park;Schienle
通讯作者：
Schienle