A Subjective Utilitarian Theory of Moral Judgment
A Subjective Utilitarian Theory of Moral Judgment
复制标题
DOI：
10.1037/xge0000210
复制
发表时间：
2016-10-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Ahn, Minwoo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cohen, Dale J.;Ahn, Minwoo
目前的理论假设道德判断是困难的，因为理性和情感的决策过程竞争。我们提出了一个根本不同的道德判断理论：道德判断的主观功利主义理论。主观功利主义理论认为，人们试图识别和保存具有最大“个人价值”的竞争项目。“只有当竞争项目具有相似的个人价值观时，道德判断才变得困难。在实验1中，我们估计了104个项目的个人价值。在实验2-5中，我们发现，估计的个人价值的分布重叠占90%以上的反应时间（RT）和反应选择的方差在道德判断任务。我们的模型从根本上重新构建了我们对道德判断的理解，从决策过程之间的竞争到价值相似的项目之间的竞争。
Current theories hypothesize that moral judgments are difficult because rational and emotional decision processes compete. We present a fundamentally different theory of moral judgment: the Subjective Utilitarian Theory of moral judgment. The Subjective Utilitarian Theory posits that people try to identify and save the competing item with the greatest "personal value." Moral judgments become difficult only when the competing items have similar personal values. In Experiment 1, we estimate the personal values of 104 items. In Experiments 2-5, we show that the distributional overlaps of the estimated personal values account for over 90% of the variance in reaction times (RTs) and response choices in a moral judgment task. Our model fundamentally restructures our understanding of moral judgments from a competition between decision processes to a competition between similarly valued items.