Financial Analysts' Forecast Revisions and Managers' Reporting Behavior
Financial Analysts' Forecast Revisions and Managers' Reporting Behavior
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1139977
复制
发表时间：
2008-05
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
A. Beyer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Beyer
本文研究了分析师的预测策略和管理者的盈余管理策略。当报告收益时，管理者权衡了由于低于分析师的预测而获得的负效用与操纵收益的成本。该模型预测：(i)分析师的预测超过报告收益的中位数；（ii）分析师更有可能向下修正其预测，而不是向上修正；（iii）当分析师的信息不太精确时，平均和中位数预测误差的幅度更大；(4)平均而言，股票市场对公布的收益比对分析师的预测更为敏感。
This paper studies an analyst's forecasting strategy and a manager's earnings management policy. When reporting earnings, the manager trades off the disutility he obtains from falling short of the analyst's forecast against the costs of manipulating earnings. The model predicts that: (i) the analyst's forecast exceeds median reported earnings; (ii) the analyst is more likely to revise his forecast downward than upward; (iii) mean and median forecast errors are larger in magnitude when the analyst has less precise information; and (iv) the stock market is, on average, more sensitive to reported earnings than to the analyst's forecasts.