Term Limits and Pork
Term Limits and Pork
复制标题
任期限制和猪肉
DOI：
10.3162/036298006x201850
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Shotts
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michael C. Herron;K. Shotts
我们描述了一个选举选择和立法政策选择的模型，该模型探讨了任期限制对立法支出的影响。在该模型中，选区中自私自利的选民更喜欢那些能带来利益的代表，而不是那些能最大化社会总福利的代表。在某些情况下，任期限制可以抑制选民选择提供特殊利益的代表，在这些情况下，任期限制可以减少猪肉支出。另一方面，当猪肉的社会效率极低时，想要向自己选区提供猪肉的代表有动机不这样做，以减少其他选区未来的猪肉供应。在这种情况下，任期限制实际上阻止了立法者促进未来的支出节制，从而矛盾地增加了猪肉支出。
We describe a model of electoral selection and legislative policy choice that explores the effects of term limits on legislative spending. In the model, self-interested voters in a collection of districts prefer representatives who deliver pork over representatives who maximize aggregate social welfare. Term limits can, in some cases, inhibit voters from selecting representatives who deliver particularistic benefits, and, in these cases, term limits reduce pork spending. On the other hand, when pork is extremely socially inefficient, representatives who want to deliver pork to their districts have incentives to refrain from doing so to reduce future pork in other districts. In this scenario, term limits actually prevent legislators from promoting future spending moderation and thus paradoxically increase pork spending.