Cultural psychology: Indexicality and socialization

Cultural psychology: Indexicality and socialization
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文化心理学:索引性和社会化

DOI:
10.1017/cbo9781139173728.009
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发表时间:
1990
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Elinor Ochs
Elinor Ochs
中科院分区:
人文科学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Elinor Ochs

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只要社会一直是一个感兴趣的和调查的对象,学者们一直在努力理解社会化的过程,大致定义为一个过程中,一个新手过渡到成为一个社会群体的成员(Cicourel,1973年;温特沃斯,1980年)。此外,世界各地的社会都在宣传他们自己的民间观点,即新手如何成为社会群体中有能力的参与者。学术和民间的社会化观点都强烈地反映和编码了人性的概念。这些概念涵盖的范围很广。例如,在19世纪的欧洲,与霍布斯的哲学相一致,人性被认为是具有攻击性和以自我为中心的,而社会化是这种反社会本性转变为亲社会倾向的过程。与此相反,本世纪的功能主义理论(帕森斯,1937,1951;默顿,1949)认为个人本质上是社会的,社会化的过程不是个人与社会之间的战斗,而是对社会价值和期望的平稳和渐进的顺应和内化。目前,由于社会心理学和认知心理学之间的重新交流,以及哲学和社会科学对个人如何通过日常社会实践构建现实感的重新兴趣,社会化过程正受到相当大的关注(见巴赫金,1981;布迪厄,1977;科尔,1985;吉登斯,1979,1984;格里芬和科尔,1984;希思,1983;米勒,1982;马奇和施韦德,1978;奥克斯和谢弗林,1984; Schieffelin & Ochs,1986 a,1986 b; Vygotsky,1978;温特沃斯,1980; Wertsch,1985)。
Introduction As long as society has been an object of interest and inquiry, scholars have been struggling to understand the process of socialization, roughly defined as a process in which a novice transitions toward becoming a member of a social group (Cicourel, 1973; Wentworth, 1980). In addition, societies the world over have promoted their own folk views about how novices become competent participants in the social group. Both scholarly and folk views of socialization strongly reflect and encode notions of human nature. These notions cover a wide range. For example, in 19th-century Europe, in consonance with the philosophy of Hobbes, human nature was thought to be aggressive and self-centered and socialization to be the process by which this asocial nature was transformed into a pro-social disposition. In contrast, functionalist theories of this century (Parsons, 1937, 1951; Merton, 1949) saw individuals as social by nature and the process of socialization not as a battle between the individual and society, but rather as a smooth and gradual conformity to and internalization of social values and expectations. Currently the process of socialization is receiving considerable attention as a result of a renewed interchange between social and cognitive psychology and a renewed interest, in philosophy and the social sciences, in how individuals construct a sense of reality through ordinary day-to-day social practices (see Bakhtin, 1981; Bourdieu, 1977; Cole, 1985; Giddens, 1979, 1984; Griffin & Cole, 1984; Heath, 1983; Miller, 1982; Much & Shweder, 1978; Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986a, 1986b; Vygotsky, 1978; Wentworth, 1980; Wertsch, 1985).