The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics
The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics
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DOI：
10.2307/2960152
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发表时间：
1996-11-01
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Londregan, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dixit, A;Londregan, J
我们研究了是什么决定了一个利益集团是否会在分肥桶政治中获得青睐，使用两个竞争政党的多数投票模型。每个集团的成员在意识形态上对政党的亲和力各不相同。个人面临着在政党关系和自己的转移收入之间的权衡。这个模型足够普遍，可以产生两个经常讨论但相互竞争的理论作为特例。如果两党在向任何群体提供转移支付方面都是同样有效的，那么这个过程的结果符合“摇摆选民”理论：两党都在争取政治核心群体，并且最愿意为了经济利益而改变他们的选票。如果团体有党派亲和力，每个政党都能更有效地向自己的支持团体提供帮助，那么我们就可以得到“机器政治”的结果，每个政党都支持自己的核心支持团体。我们从理论上推导出这些结果，并在特定的例子中说明其操作。
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts.The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed bur competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, then the outcome of the process conforms to the ''swing voter'' theory: both parties woo the groups that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in response to economic favors. If groups have party affinities, and each party is more effective in delivering favors to its own support group, then we can get the ''machine politics'' outcome, where each party favors its core support group. We derive these results theoretically, and illustrate their operation in particular examples.