Optimal Search in Negotiation Analysis

Optimal Search in Negotiation Analysis
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谈判分析中的最优搜索

DOI:
10.1177/0022002785029003004
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发表时间:
1985
影响因子:
3.1
通讯作者:
D. Lax
D. Lax
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
D. Lax

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谈判者的保留价格或“底线”直接取决于无协议替代方案对拟议谈判协议的价值。通常,一个人的无协议替代品是不确定的,找到它们需要昂贵的搜索,就像卖方必须花费精力,时间和金钱来寻找潜在买家一样。搜索的价值应决定卖方在与潜在买方交易时的底线或保留价格。最优搜索和停止理论提出了有用的程序和技巧,以评估一个人的保留价格在谈判中,并在备选方案中搜索。
A negotiator's reservation price or “bottom line” depends directly on the value of the no-agreement alternative to a proposed negotiated agreement. Often, one's no-agreement alternatives are uncertain and finding them requires a costly search, as in the case of a seller who must expend effort, time, and money in finding potential buyers. The value of the search should determine the seller's bottom-line or reservation price in dealings with a prospective buyer. Optimal search and stopping theory suggest useful procedures and heuristics for evaluating one's reservation price in negotiation and for searching among alternatives.
DOI: 10.2307/2987329
发表时间: 1970-06
期刊: --
影响因子: --
作者:
M. Degroot
通讯作者: M. Degroot