Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task Assignment
Truthful Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Task Assignment
复制标题
众包任务分配的真实机制
DOI:
10.1109/cloud.2017.72
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发表时间:
2017-06
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Zhiqiu Huang
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yonglong Zhang;Haiyan Qin;Bin Li;Jin Wang;Sungyoung Lee;Zhiqiu Huang
As an emerging human-solving paradigm, crowdsourcing has attracted much attention where requesters want to employ reliable workers to complete the specific task. Task assignment is a vital branch in crowdsourcing. Most existing works in crowdsourcing haven't taken self-interested individuals' strategy into account. To guarantee truthfulness, auction has been regarded as a promising form to charge requesters and reward workers. In this paper, we consider an online task assignment scenario, where each worker has a set of experienced skills, whereas specific task is budget-constrained and requires certain skill. Under this scenario, we model the crowdsourcing task assignment as a reverse auction in which requesters are buyers and workers are sellers. Specially, our paper studies simple task case where the requester ask for single skill. We propose TMC-VCG and TMC-ST and prove the related properties for the mechanisms theoretically. Meanwhile, through extensive simulations, we verify the truthfulness and also evaluate other performance.
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影响因子:
1.7
作者:
MYERSON, RB
通讯作者:
MYERSON, RB
DOI:
10.1016/j.eswa.2017.06.004
发表时间:
2017-11
期刊:
Expert Syst. Appl.
影响因子:
--
作者:
Mahdieh Zabihimayvan;Reza Sadeghi;H. N. Rude;Derek Doran
通讯作者:
Mahdieh Zabihimayvan;Reza Sadeghi;H. N. Rude;Derek Doran
DOI:
10.1016/j.eswa.2017.04.021
发表时间:
2017-10
期刊:
Expert Syst. Appl.
影响因子:
--
作者:
Lei Zhang;D. Zhang;Ming-ming Sun;Fangmei Chen
通讯作者:
Lei Zhang;D. Zhang;Ming-ming Sun;Fangmei Chen
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_4
发表时间:
2015-05
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
作者:
Sujit Gujar;B. Faltings
通讯作者:
Sujit Gujar;B. Faltings
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2015-05
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
作者:
Arpita Biswas;Shweta Jain;Debmalya Mandal;Y. Narahari
通讯作者:
Arpita Biswas;Shweta Jain;Debmalya Mandal;Y. Narahari