Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?
Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?
复制标题
后共产主义民主中的战略投票？
DOI：
10.1017/s0007123402000030
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
H. Palmer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Duch;H. Palmer
新民主国家缺乏战略性投票是对民主巩固的潜在威胁，因为它可能抑制稳定的政党制度的发展。然而，我们能指望新民主国家的公民已经发展出与民主选举中的战略性投票相关的技能吗？基于匈牙利，一个后共产主义民主国家的证据，本文认为，在新的民主国家的公民对战略投票的情况下，与传统的战略投票理论一致的方式。对匈牙利过去三次全国选举的投票统计数据的分析表明，选民根据战略投票理论，大力惩罚较小的政党，从而导致参加匈牙利选举的有效政党数量迅速减少。我们认为，战略性投票发生在两个阶段：（1）认识到一个“浪费选票”的情况和（2）对这种情况的战略反应。
The absence of strategic voting in new democracies represents a potential threat to democratic consolidation because it could inhibit the development of a stable party system. Yet can we expect that citizens in new democracies have developed the skills associated with strategic voting in democratic elections? Based on evidence from Hungary, a post-communist democracy, this article suggests that citizens in new democracies respond to strategic voting situations in a fashion consistent with conventional theories of strategic voting. Analysis of Hungarian voting statistics over the past three national elections indicates that voters, consistent with strategic voting theories, vigorously penalized smaller parties thereby contributing to the rapid decline in the number of effective parties competing in Hungarian elections. We argue that strategic voting occurs in two stages: (1) recognition of a ‘wasted-vote’ situation and (2) strategic response to that situation.