Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract
Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract
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DOI：
10.1061/(asce)0733-9364(2007)133:5(385
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发表时间：
2007-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Liyin Shen;Hj Bao;Yuzhe Wu;Weisheng Lu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Liyin Shen;Hj Bao;Yuzhe Wu;Weisheng Lu
本文将建设-经营-转让 (BOT) 特许权模型 (BOTCcM) 扩展为一种利用讨价还价博弈理论来确定特许期的新方法。特许期是安排 BOT 类型合同时最重要的决策变量之一，但很少有方法可以帮助确定该变量的值。 BOTCcM 提出了一种替代方法，通过该方法产生一组特许期解决方案。然而，使用 BOTCcM 的一个典型弱点是该模型无法推荐优惠的具体时间跨度。本文引入了一种称为BOT谈判特许权模型（BOTBaC）的新方法，以识别特定的特许权期限，该方法考虑了BOT合同中有关两方（即投资者和政府）的讨价还价行为。通过实例演示了BOTBaC的应用。
This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.