Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal
Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal
复制标题
部分约束平台：竞选承诺与背叛成本
DOI：
10.1111/jere.12053
复制
发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Yasushi Asako
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gary Hansen;Minchung Hsu and Junsang Lee;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;Minchung Hsu;荒渡良・宮本由紀;荒渡良;Yasushi Asako
本研究探讨和模型的影响，部分绑定的竞选纲领在政治竞争。在这里，一个候选人如果实施了与政纲不同的政策，就必须付出背叛的代价，而且这种代价会随着差异的大小而增加。我还分析了公民竞选的内生决定。特别是，该模型能够显示两个含义，以前的框架有困难。首先，不同特征的候选人赢得选举的概率不同。第二，即使知道自己会输，候选人仍然会参加竞选，希望使对手的政策接近自己的政策。
This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent’s policy approach his/her own policy.