The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
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供应商和相互外包对组织形式的影响
DOI：
10.1111/caje.12638
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Noriaki Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yasuhiro Arai;Noriaki Matsushima
本文考虑了一个具有垄断性共同供应商的下游双寡头模型，两个对称的下游厂商之间相互外包。市场结构反映了智能手机行业最近的采购环境。我们还将管理授权纳入双寡头模型，因为在几乎所有行业中，决定企业内部的组织形式对于实现更好的绩效至关重要。存在一个均衡，其中只有一家公司将其下游生产委托给销售经理。一个授权的公司变得不那么咄咄逼人。两个公司都委托的利润可能比没有公司委托的利润高。当两个企业都委托时，社会福利可能小于没有企业委托时的社会福利。
We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.