Incentive compatible two-tiered resource allocation without money
Incentive compatible two-tiered resource allocation without money
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激励兼容两级资源配置无需金钱
DOI：
10.5555/2615731.2617457
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Cavallo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Cavallo
我们考虑了两种商品的资源分配问题：一种是所有代理的价值大致相同的大量商品，另一种是代理对稀缺商品进行不同估值的资源分配问题(例如，假设一个普通计算集群上的作业请求与一个受限的高性能集群上的作业请求)。社会规划者寻求将稀缺的资源分配给最珍视它的代理人。我们背离了通常的机制设计方法，假设货币支付是不可行的，而是使用彩票和不分配的威胁来引发真实的价值报告。采用在收入再分配背景下发展的思想，我们检查是否存在产生预期福利的分配规则，该分配规则在均衡后超过随机分配稀缺资源的基线，并发现只有在价值分布不具有单调递增的风险率的情况下，答案才是肯定的。对于富足商品的剩余索取者的变量设置，我们确定了一种机制，即随着人口规模的增长，福利收敛到完全有效的分配。
We consider a resource allocation problem with two types of goods: a plentiful good that all agents have approximately the same value for, and a scarce good that agents value differently (imagine, e.g., job requests on an ordinary computing cluster versus a restricted high-performance cluster). A social planner seeks to allocate the scarce resource to the agent who values it most. We depart from the usual mechanism design approach by assuming monetary payments are infeasible, and instead use lotteries and the threat of non-allocation to elicit truthful value reporting. Adapting ideas developed in the context of revenue redistribution, we examine whether there exist allocation rules yielding expected welfare that--in ex post equilibrium--exceeds that of a baseline that randomly assigns the scarce resource, and find the answer is yes only in cases where the value distribution does not have a monotonically increasing hazard rate. For a variant setting with a residual claimant for the plentiful good, we identify a mechanism with welfare converging to that of perfectly efficient allocation as the population size grows.