Related Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions
复制标题

DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.591285
复制
发表时间：
2004-09
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Kohlbeck;Brian W. Mayhew
M. Kohlbeck;Brian W. Mayhew
中科院分区：
其他
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Kohlbeck;Brian W. Mayhew

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

我们描述了关联方（RP）交易，并调查财务激励和监督的决定因素，从事RP交易的公司。我们的样本包括标准普尔1500指数中的1,261家公司。RP交易在我们的样本中很常见，但在交易类型和披露方面存在很大差异。最常见的RP交易是贷款，这在很大程度上被萨班斯奥克斯利第402条所禁止。披露方法-财务报表脚注或代理-似乎主要是基于美元的重要性问题。我们还分析了两大类RP交易的决定因素-财务激励和监控。我们发现，较弱的公司治理与RP交易，CEO和董事的现金报酬和RP交易之间的负相关关系，和CEO股票期权和RP交易之间的正相关关系。然而，董事和高级管理人员的所有权与RP交易无关。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，董事和高管薪酬，公司治理和关联方交易之间的关联。
We describe related party (RP) transactions and investigate financial incentive and monitoring determinants for firms engaged in RP transactions. Our sample consists of 1,261 firms included in the S&P 1500. RP transactions are common in our sample, but vary substantially as to transaction type and disclosure. The most common RP transactions are loans, which are now largely prohibited by Section 402 of Sarbanes Oxley. Method of disclosure - financial statement footnote or proxy - appears largely driven by dollar-based materiality concerns. We also analyze two broad classes of determinants of RP transactions - financial incentives and monitoring. We find weaker corporate governance is associated with RP transactions, an inverse relationship between CEO and director's cash compensation and RP transactions, and a positive association between CEO stock options and RP transactions. However, director and officer ownership are not associated with RP transactions. Overall our results suggest associations between director and officer compensation, corporate governance and related party transactions.