Energy technology investments in competitive and regulatory environments
Energy technology investments in competitive and regulatory environments
复制标题
竞争和监管环境中的能源技术投资
DOI：
10.1007/s10669-015-9569-y
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Xiaoyue Jiang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Shittu;Geoffrey G. Parker;Xiaoyue Jiang
本文的目的是更好地了解能源公司如何在监管风险的背景下应对竞争压力。我们模拟竞争压力如何影响企业对其技术组合进行的产能投资。利用比较静态数据，我们描述了在产出和价格不完全竞争以及不同环境监管制度下能源公司投资不同能源技术的动机。我们发现，在古诺竞争下，投资可再生技术的公司受益于其整体利润的战略效应和溢出效应。在伯特兰竞争下，只有投资传统技术的公司才能享受到这些好处。我们的研究结果可以为政策制定者提供指导。值得注意的是，即使监管机构设定的目标相对较弱，也可能刺激对可再生技术的额外投资。无论政策类型如何，战略互动和溢出效益都会推动能源技术研发活动的优化管理。我们的研究结果还为监管机构提供了利用竞争市场不完善的固有优势来刺激企业改进其投资组合中的技术的方法。总体而言，我们的结果描述了企业、市场结构和环境政策选择之间的战略互动如何塑造技术投资激励。
The goal of this paper was to develop a better understanding of how energy firms might respond to competitive pressures in the context of regulatory risk. We model how competitive pressures affect capacity investments that firms make into their portfolio of technologies. Using comparative statics, we characterize energy firms’ incentives to invest in different energy technologies under imperfect competition in outputs and prices and within different environmental regulatory regimes. We find that under Cournot competition, firms that invest in renewable technologies benefit from both strategic and spillover effects on their overall profits. Under Bertrand competition, these benefits are enjoyed only by firms that invest in conventional technologies. Our findings can provide guidance for policy makers. Notably, even relatively weak targets set by regulators are likely to spur additional investment into renewable technologies. Regardless of policy type, strategic interactions and spillover benefits drive the optimal management of energy technology R&D activities. Our results also suggest ways for regulators to exploit the inherent benefits of imperfections in competitive markets to stimulate firms’ efforts at improving on the technologies in their portfolios. Overall, our results describe how technology investment incentives are shaped by the strategic interactions between firms, market structures, and environmental policy choices.