Insider bargaining power, starting wages, and involuntary unemployment
Insider bargaining power, starting wages, and involuntary unemployment
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内部议价能力、起薪和非自愿失业
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tomas Sjöström
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nils Gottfries;Tomas Sjöström
最近对工资谈判的分析强调了内部人员和外部人员之间的区别，但人们通常认为内部人员和最近雇用的外部人员支付相同的工资。我们考虑了一个模型，其中外部人员的起始工资可能低于内部人员的工资，但与营业额相关的激励约束会影响合同的形式。我们研究了在什么条件下，起薪与内部工资挂钩，以便内部人的议价能力提高起薪，减少雇用外部人。
Recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders, yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage. We consider a model where the starting wage for outsiders may be lower than the insider wage, but incentive constraints associated with turnover affect the form of the contract. We examine under what conditions the starting wage is linked to the insider wage so that increased bargaining power of insiders raises the starting wage and reduces hiring of outsiders.