On Cheap Talk and Burned Money
On Cheap Talk and Burned Money
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关于廉价言论和烧钱
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Navin Kartik
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作者：
Navin Kartik
Austen-Smith和Banks（Journal of Economic Theory，2000）研究了烧钱如何扩展Crawford和Sobel（Econometrica，1982）的纯廉价谈话均衡。本文证明了他们关于当烧钱上界收缩到0时均衡集连续的猜想。然后，我研究如何设置的均衡可以使用前向归纳法。虽然标准的标准，如D1或神性被证明是相对无效的，一个更强的版本，单调D1标准，是非常有用的。我的特点，这样的均衡类的任意数量的可用烧钱，并证明，作为烧钱上界收缩到0，唯一的集合收敛到最翔实的均衡的纯廉价谈话游戏（在标准的规律性条件下）。我还确定了一个错误，奥斯汀-史密斯和银行的主要定理，并提供了一个变体，保留了一些重要的影响。
Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). This paper proves their conjecture on continuity of the equilibrium set as the upper bound on burned money shrinks to 0. I then study how the set of equilibria can be reflned using forward-induction. While standard criteria such as D1 or divinity are shown to be relatively inefiective, a stronger version, the monotonic D1 criterion, is quite useful. I characterize the class of such equilibria for an arbitrary amount of available burned money, and prove that as the upper bound on burned money shrinks to 0, the set converges uniquely to the most informative equilibrium of the pure cheap talk game (under a standard regularity condition). I also identify an error in Austen-Smith and Banks’ main Theorem, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications.