National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?
National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?
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各国议会和欧元区危机：在困难时期掌握主动权？
DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2014.990694
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Höing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Höing
欧元区危机表明，欧盟政策制定中的行政主导地位显著增强。在欧洲峰会上作出的不透明的紧急决定，以及在欧盟法律框架之外建立的条约，为民主选举产生的议院提供了便利。这一事态发展带来了欧盟政策制定过程中出现新一波非议会化的风险。然而，各国议会对危机管理的有效审查对于让国家掌握经济和货币联盟(经货联盟)改革的主导权是不可或缺的。本文调查了各国议会参与制定应对危机的工具的情况。基于2010-2012年与危机有关的议会活动的量化数据集，文章观察到在审查危机管理方面的参与非常不均衡。欧盟事务中的体制特权以及宏观经济因素可以部分解释观察到的差异。然而，令人惊讶的是，与危机相关的议会活动并不是对议会或公众中的欧洲怀疑论态度的反应。
The eurozone crisis suggests a significant reinforcement of executive dominance in EU policy-making. Opaque emergency decisions taken at European summits as well as treaties established outside of the EU legal framework facilitate the side-lining of democratically elected chambers. This development entails the risk of a new wave of de-parliamentarisation in EU policy-making. An effective scrutiny of crisis management by national parliaments is, however, indispensable for taking national ownership of the reforms in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This paper investigates national parliaments’ involvement in the development of instruments to combat the crisis. Based on a quantitative dataset of crisis-related parliamentary activities in 2010–2012, the article observes a very uneven engagement in the scrutiny of crisis management. Institutional prerogatives in EU affairs as well as macro-economic factors can partly explain the observed variation. Surprisingly, however, crisis-related parliamentary activity is not a reaction to Eurosceptic attitudes either in parliament or among the public.