Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation
Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation
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选拔赛、破坏和参与
DOI：
10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00163.x
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Münster
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Münster
本文研究了三人以上竞赛中的破坏行为，其中参赛者之间相互了解。每个参赛者都有动机直接破坏专门针对他最危险的对手。在均衡中，选择更高生产力努力的竞争者受到的破坏更严重。这也许可以解释心理学的发现，在那里，围攻的受害者有时会被发现表现出色。此外，蓄意破坏使晋升机会均等。如果生产函数在破坏方面是线性的，并且成本函数只取决于所有破坏活动的总和，那么这种影响最为明显：在内部均衡中，谁将获胜是一个机会问题，即使竞争者的能力相差很大。这反过来又会对谁想参加锦标赛产生不利影响。由于更好的参赛者预计他们将受到更强烈的破坏，可能会发生最有能力的人留在外面，比赛以概率1选择能力较低的人之一。我还研究了一些参赛者是容易受害者的情况，即比其他人更容易破坏。
This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants who choose a higher productive effort are sabotaged more heavily. This might explain findings from psychology, where victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most pronounced if the production function is linear in sabotage, and the cost function depends only on the sum of all sabotage activities: in an interior equilibrium, who will win is a matter of chance, even when contestants differ a great deal in their abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences for who might want to participate in a tournament. Since better contestants anticipate that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out and the tournament selects one of the less able with probability one. I also study the case where some contestants are easy victims, i.e. easier to sabotage than others.