The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty
The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty
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DOI：
10.1098/rspb.2014.0876
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发表时间：
2014-09-07
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Perry, Jennifer C.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Biernaskie, Jay M.;Grafen, Alan;Perry, Jennifer C.
动物经常传递有用的信息，尽管信号者和接收者之间存在利益冲突。对于这种“诚实”的信号，特别是当信号的大小或强度可靠地指示信号发送者的潜在质量时，有两种主要的解释。成本信号理论（包括障碍原则）预测，不诚实的信号是太昂贵的伪造，而指数假说预测，不诚实的信号不能伪造。最近的证据表明，个体素质和信号增长之间存在高度保守的因果关系，这似乎支持了指数假说。然而，不清楚的是，这也减少了昂贵的信号理论，因为经常建议。在这里，通过将信号增长的机制到昂贵的信号理论，我们表明，指数信号实际上可以受到青睐，由于不诚实的成本。我们的结论是，昂贵的信号理论提供了最终的，适应性的理由诚实的信号，而指数假说描述了一个接近（和潜在的非常普遍）的机制，实现诚实。
Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such 'honest' signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.