Secret handshake scheme with request-based-revealing
Secret handshake scheme with request-based-revealing
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DOI：
10.1016/j.camwa.2012.07.007
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发表时间：
2011-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yutaka Kawai;N. Kunihiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yutaka Kawai;N. Kunihiro
秘密握手（SH）方案使属于同一组的两个成员能够以一种对所有其他成员隐藏其与该组的隶属关系的方式对彼此进行身份验证。在先前关于SH的工作中，G组的组权限（GA）已被证明具有显示属于G的握手玩家的身份（ID）的能力。在SH系统中，显示恶意玩家的能力非常重要。本文首先对遗传算法的可追溯性进行了分类。我们将此特征分类如下：(i) G的GA能够通过使用握手协议的副本来揭示属于G的成员的id；（ii） G的GA能够通过使用握手协议的记录来确认握手玩家是否属于G。以往在该领域的研究只考虑了前一种能力。在某些情况下，只需要后一种功能。接下来，我们考虑一个SH系统，GA只有一种能力来确认握手玩家是否属于他自己的组，而不透露他的ID。最简单的方法是去掉成员ID，让成员拥有一个共同的组ID。但是，如果成员ID不存在，则在发生争议时无法显示握手玩家的ID。因此，我们引入了具有基于请求的显示（SHRBR）的SH。在SHRBR方案中，GA可以检查握手玩家是否属于自己的群组，但不能单独显示成员id。在握手者a与B执行握手协议后，如果a想要透露一个握手伙伴（在本例中为B）， a要求GA通过提供自己的ID和a的秘密信息来透露握手伙伴的ID。我们定义了SHRBR方案的安全需求，并提出了SHRBR-1和SHRBR-2两个具体的SHRBR方案。我们证明了所提出的SHRBR方案满足随机oracle模型的安全性要求。
Secret handshake (SH) schemes enable two members who belong to the same group to authenticate each other in a way that hides their affiliation to that group from all others. In previous work on SH, the group authority (GA) of the group G has been shown to have the ability to reveal the identity (ID) of a handshake player who belongs to G. The capability to reveal a malicious player is important in SH systems. In this paper, we focus first on the classification of traceability of GA. We classify this feature as follows: (i) GA of G is able to reveal IDs of members belonging to G by using a transcript of a handshake protocol; and (ii) GA of G is able to confirm whether handshake players belong to G or not by using a transcript of a handshake protocol. Previous research in this field only considers the former capability. In some situations, only the latter capability is needed. Next, we consider a SH system that GA has only an ability to confirm whether a handshake player belongs to his own group without revealing his ID. The most naive method is that member IDs are eliminated and members have a common group ID. However, if member ID does not exist, one cannot reveal the handshake player’s ID in the event of disputes. Thus, we introduce a SH with request-based-revealing (SHRBR). In SHRBR schemes, GA can check whether handshake players belong to their own group, but cannot reveal member IDs alone. After a handshake player A executes a handshake protocol with B, if A wants to reveal a handshake partner (in this case B), A requests GA to reveal a handshake partner’s ID by bringing forth his own ID and secret information of A. We define the security requirements for SHRBR schemes and propose two concrete SHRBR schemes, SHRBR-1 and SHRBR-2. We prove that the proposed SHRBR schemes satisfy security requirements in the random oracle model.