Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation
Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation
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DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.007
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发表时间:
2015-03-01
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
Pass, Rafael
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Halpern, Joseph Y.;Pass, Rafael
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock paper scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.