Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation

Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation
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DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.007
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发表时间:
2015-03-01
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
Pass, Rafael
Pass, Rafael
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Halpern, Joseph Y.;Pass, Rafael

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我们开发了一个通用的博弈论框架,用于推理执行可能昂贵的计算的战略代理。在这个框架下,许多传统的博弈论结果(如纳什均衡的存在性)不再成立。尽管如此,我们可以使用这个框架来为在研究充分的游戏中观察到的行为提供心理上吸引人的解释(例如重复的囚徒困境和剪刀石头布)。此外,我们提供了自然条件的游戏足以保证均衡存在。(C)由Elsevier Inc.出版。
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock paper scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.