Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
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合同损害与合作投资
DOI：
10.2307/2556047
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Chung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yeon;T. Chung
我们研究了对投资者的贸易伙伴产生直接利益的特定投资（称为“合作投资”）的替代违约救济。我们发现：(1)期望损害表现很差，没有引起合作投资；（ii）私下规定的违约金可以实现更好的结果（尽管效率低下）；（iii）如果事后重新协商是可能的，信赖损害赔偿表现最好，达到最有效的结果。这些排名与现有文献中的排名形成对比，但它们解释了许多观察到的承包实践。
We study alternative breach remedies in the presence of specific investments that generate a direct benefit to the investor's trading partner (referred to as "cooperative investments."). We find that (i) expectation damages perform very poorly, inducing no cooperative investment; (ii) privately stipulated liquidated damages can achieve a better, albeit inefficient, outcome; and (iii) the reliance damages perform the best, achieving the efficient outcome if ex post renegotiation is possible. These rankings stand in contrast to those found in the existing literature, but they explain many observed contracting practices.