Market Analysis in the Presence of Indirect Constraints and Captive Sales
Market Analysis in the Presence of Indirect Constraints and Captive Sales
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存在间接约束和自保销售的市场分析
DOI：
10.1093/joclec/nhl025
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
T. Valletti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Inderst;T. Valletti
本文分析了垂直整合企业存在下的商业市场。我们讨论了由于零售市场产生的间接约束，垂直整合何时倾向于增加商业市场（衍生）需求的弹性。我们还讨论了市场力量的不同措施的相关性，如批发或零售市场的市场份额。我们对垂直整合下的上游合并可能产生的影响提供了见解，这取决于，例如，被整合的公司目前是否向商业市场出售，或者是否可以在合并后预期出售。
This paper analyzes merchant markets in the presence of vertically-integrated firms. We discuss when vertical integration tends to increase the elasticity of (derived) demand in the merchant market because of indirect contraints arising from the retail market. We also discuss the relevance of different measures of market power such as market shares in the wholesale or retail market. We provide insights into the likely effect of an upstream merger under vertical integration, depending on, for instance, whether the integrated firm currently sells into the merchant market or whether this can be expected after the merger.